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INTRODUCTION: TIGER 
WOODS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
TYLER TRENT OCHOA * 
The story of Tiger Woods' rise to fame is by now a familiar one. 
In 1991, he became the youngest player ever to win the U.S. Junior 
Amateur Championship, an event he won two more times.! In 1994, 
he became the youngest player ever to win the U.S. Amateur 
Championship.2 Immediately after winning his third consecutive U.S. 
Amateur Championship in 1996, Woods joined the PGA Tour and won 
two tournaments in his first four months of competition.3 In 1997, at 
age 21, he became the youngest player ever to win the Masters 
Tournament, setting records for low score (18 under par) and largest 
margin of victory (12 strokes).4 Since then, Woods has completed a 
career grand slam, winning the PGA Championship in 1999 and 2000, 
and the U.S. Open and British Open in 2000.5 
Sports artist Rick Rush witnessed the 1997 Masters and saw 
history being made. To commemorate the event, he painted a picture 
entitled "The Masters of Augusta.,,6 The picture depicts Woods in 
three different positions, accompanied by his caddie.7 In the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Whittier Law School. A.B. 1983, J.D. 1987, 
Stanford University. Copyright 2000 Tyler Trent Ochoa. 
1. All About Tiger. Biography, <http://cbs.sportsline.comlulfans/celebrity/tiger/ 
aboutlindex.html> (accessed Nov. 26, 2000). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publg., Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 830 (N.D. Ohio 2000), 
appealfiled, No. 00-3584 (6th Cir. 2000). 
7. Rick Rush, The Masters of Augusta (Limited Edition Print (1998» (available at 
381 
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background are the ghostly figures of six golfing legends: Arnold 
Palmer, Sam Snead, Ben Hogan, Walter Hagen, Bobby Jones, and Jack 
Nicklaus.8 Rush's exclusive distributor, Jireh Publishing, Inc., 
reproduced the painting in a limited edition of 5000 lithographs for sale 
to the pUblic.9 
In 1998, Tiger Woods' exclusive licensing agent, ETW Corp., 
sued Jireh for trademark infringement and violation of Woods' state­
law right of publicity.IO The case immediately attracted national 
attention as another example of the commercialization of sports and the 
battle between artists, celebrities, and the media for control over their 
intellectual property. I I 
After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment.12 
The district court issued its decision on April 10, 2000, holding that no 
trademark violation had occurred, and that Jireh had not infringed 
Woods' right of publicityY Regarding the trademark claim, the court 
held that "there is no evidence that plaintiff actuallr used the allegedly 
infringing image of Tiger Woods as a trademark,,,1 and that the use of 
Woods' name was "descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith 
only to describe" the print.15 Regarding the right of publicity claim, 
the court held that "paintings and drawings are protected by the First 
Amendment.,,16 The court found that "the print at issue herein is an 
artistic creation seeking to express a message,,,17 and it rejected ETW's 
<www.jirehpub.comlindexb.html» (accessed Nov. 26, 2000). 
8. Id. 
9. ETW Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 830, 835. 
10. Id. at 830-31. 
11. See e.g. Editorial, The Bullying of a Painter, Denver Rocky Mt. News 28A 
(Feb. 23, 1999); Marcia Chambers, Lawsuit Pits Artists' Rights vs. Athletes', N.Y. 
Times D3 (Feb. 16, 1999); Stan Hochman, Philadelphia Daily News, Painting 
Controversy Raises Privacy Issues, reprinted in Pitt. Post-Gaz. D l l (Mar. 28, 1999); 
Reggie Rivers, Selling of Woods' Likeness by Artist Goes Out of Bounds, Denver 
Rocky Mt. News 4C (Feb. 28, 1999); James Warren, Painter Lets Loose a Tiger with 
Woods Lithos, Chi. Trib., Tempo Mag. 2 (May 28, 1999); ABC World News Tonight, 
The Battle Over Tiger Woods Right of Publicity Laws, (Feb. 20, 1999) (available in 
1999 WL 8588564). 
12. ETW Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30. 
13. Id. at 834, 836 n. 4. 
14. Id. at 832. 
15. Id. at 833 (quoting 15 U.S. c. § 1115(b)(4) (1999)). 
16. Id. at 835. 
17. /d. at 836. 
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argument that the prints were '''merely sports merchandise' not entitled 
to First Amendment protection.,,18 
At its heart, the Tiger Woods case presents a stark example of the 
inherent conflict between two seemingly reasonable legal positions. 
One the one hand, if Rick Rush and Jireh are making money from 
selling images of Tiger Woods, shouldn't Woods be entitled to a cut of 
the profits? On the other hand, shouldn't the First Amendment protect 
Rush's right as an artist to paint any subject he wants and to 
disseminate his artistic creations as widely as possible without 
government interference?19 
Although the right of publicity has been recognized as a distinct 
common-law doctrine since 1953,20 only in recent years have courts 
begun to take the First Amendment seriously as a limit on the extent to 
which sports figures and other celebrities can use the doctrine to 
control the use of their images.21 It is widely recognized that the 
government may prohibit false and misleading speech, such as an 
advertisement that falsely implies an endorsement of a product by an 
individual, without violating the First Amendment.22 Similarly, it is 
generally acknowledged that the First Amendment protects the 
depiction of celebrities in news reports and in movies and television 
18. Id. at 834. 
19. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that the First Amendment (as applied 
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment) applies to private lawsuits to enforce state 
and federal laws as well as to direct governmental censorship. See New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("Although this is a civil lawsuit between 
private parties, the [state] courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners 
claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and 
press . . . . The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever 
the form, whether that power has in fact been exercised."). 
20. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 
(2d Cir. 1953). In formulating the doctrine, Haelan drew upon several right of privacy 
cases from the early part of the twentieth century. Id. See Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Amicus Curiae Brief of 73 Law Professors in Support of 
Defendant/Appellee Jireh Publishing, Inc., for Affirmance, 22 Whittier L. Rev. 389, 
402 (2000). 
21. Zimmerman, supra n. 20, at 404-06. 
22. See e.g. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992) (using 
radio commercial with imitation of Waits' singing voice); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 
849 F.2d 460, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1988) (using television commercial with imitation of 
Midler's singing voice); Allen v. Natl. Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (using celebrity "look-alike" in television commercial). 
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"docudramas.,,23 But in between these two paradigms, less agreement 
exists. Who is entitled to profit from the depiction of celebrities in a 
variety of non-advertising, non-news reporting and non-narrative 
contexts, such as baseball cards,24 collectible plates,25 T-shirts,26 
figurines,27 calendars,28 and posters?29 Should control rest with the 
artist who creates the image, or the celebrity who is being depicted? 
Another recent case that raises this issue is Comedy III 
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,30 which is currently pending 
before the California Supreme Court. Saderup is an artist whose 
medium is charcoal on paper.31 Saderup created a charcoal picture of 
the Three Stooges, and reproduced it in lithographs and T-shirts for 
23. See e.g. Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979) 
(Tobriner, Manuel & Newman, JJ., concurring) (involving television biography of 
Rudolph Valentino); Taylor v. Natl. Broad. Co., 22 Media L. Rep. 2433, 2433 (Cal. 
Super. 1994) (involving television biography of Elizabeth Taylor). 
24. Compare Haelan, 202 F.2d at 668-70 with Cardtoons, L.c. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Assn., 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects trading cards featuring parodies of baseball players). 
25. See e.g. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1022-29 (C.D. Cal. 
1998) (granting motion to dismiss right of publicity claim, based on British law, for 
"England's Rose Heirloom Collector Plate" featuring picture of Diana, Princess of 
Wales). 
26. See e.g. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Choppy Prods., Inc., 347 N.Y.S.2d 83, 83-85 
(1972) (holding that T-shirts bearing name and picture of Howard Hughes violate 
Hughes' right of publicity). 
27. See e.g. Cairns, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (involving claims for "Diana, Princess 
of Wales Porcelain Portrait Doll"); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. 
v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (upholding right of 
publicity in suit to enjoin sale of plastic busts of Martin Luther King, Jr.). 
28. See e.g. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581, 586 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that calendars featuring cover photograph of Babe Ruth did not violate 
plaintiff's trademark). . 
29. Compare Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221-22 (2d Cir. 
1978) (holding posters of Elvis Presley with caption "In Memory 1935-1977" are a 
commercial product) with Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
639,639,643 (App. 6th Dist. 1995) (holding reproduction of newspaper sports page as 
a poster is immune under the First Amendment). 
30. 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (App. 2d Dist. Div. 2 1998), review granted, 973 P.2d 512 
(Cal. 1999). In California, the grant of review vacates the Court of Appeal opinion. 
See Cal. R. Ct. 976(d)(West 2000) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, 
no opinion superseded by a grant of review . . .  shall be published."); Cal. R. Ct. 977(a) 
(West 2000) (prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions except in limited 
circumstances). 
31. Comedy III Prods., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466. 
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sale to the pUblic.32 The California Court of Appeal rejected Saderup's 
First Amendment defense, stating that although the First Amendment 
protects "political, religious, philosophical or ideological messages" on 
T-shirts,3 "there is neither contention nor demonstration that 
defendants sought to convey or sell a message of any type in or on their 
T-shirts, or for that matter their prints.,,34 More succinctly, it held that 
"reproductions of an image, made to be sold for profit, do not per se 
constitute speech.,,35 Given the U.S. Supreme Court's express 
recognition (albeit in dicta) that paintings are entitled to First 
Amendment protection even if they do not contain a "message,,,36 the 
reasoning of the California Court of Appeal is obviously deficient. 
Paintings and drawings are speech, and are entitled to some measure of 
constitutional protection. Moreover, given that federal copyright law 
gives artists the exclusive right to reproduce and sell their works,37 
there is a lurking issue of federal preemption that has not yet been 
adequately addressed.38 . 
One possible resolution of these issues might lie in copyright 
law's distinction between the work being reproduced and any "useful 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 469 (quoting Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc. v. City & County ofS.F., 952 F.2d 
1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1990». 
34. Jd. 
35. Id. at 470. 
36. See Hurley v. Irish-Am., Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
568 (1995) ("a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized 
message,' would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
Pollock.") (citation omitted). 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (granting exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted 
work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute the copyrighted work to the public, and 
to publicly perform and publicly display the copyrighted work). These rights are 
subject to a number of exemptions and limitations, including fair use. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 
107-122 (1994). 
38. See Wendt v. Host Intl., Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (using animatronic 
robots resembling actors who portrayed characters on television show "Cheers"), reh 'g 
denied, 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, Kleinfeld & Tashima, JJ., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, sub nom. Paramount Pictures v. Wendt, 
68 U.S.L.W. 3631, 2000 WL 343466 (Oct. 2, 2000). Judge Kozinski's opinion argues 
that the decision in favor of Wendt and Ratzenberger (1) conflicts with and is 
preempted by Paramount's right to create derivative works under the Federal Copyright 
Act; (2) violates the Dormant Commerce Clause; and (3) violates the First 
Amendment. Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1286-89. 
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article" on which the work is reproduced.39 It could be argued, for 
example, that federal copyright law preempts the right of publicity in 
ordinary reproductions of the work, but that state law may grant 
celebrities a share of the profits when the artist depicts them on "useful 
articles" such as T-shirts and coffee mugs.40 While such a compromise 
might be satisfactory from an economic point of view, it is difficult to 
understand why T-shirts and coffee mugs should not be considered 
equally legitimate as vehicles for First Amendment expression as 
lithographs and posters.41 The content is the same; only the medium of 
expression is different.42 
Beyond the issue of depictions of celebrities in paintings, prints, 
and drawings lies the realm of advertising. It is clear that the First 
Amendment does not shield a false representation or implication that a 
celebrity endorses a product.43 But other advertising uses raise 
troubling issues about the use of the right of publicity to suppress 
criticism of the celebrity'S "image.,,44 In one familiar (perhaps even 
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The Copyright Act defines a "useful article" as "an 
article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the 
appearance of the article or to convey information." 
40. See e.g. J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, § 7.22, 7-44 
(2d ed. 2000). 
41. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 
9 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 35, 63 (1998) ("Furthermore, the mere fact that 
information appears on a utilitarian object does not deprive it of its identity as speech. 
Many products carry such significant communicative freight that they are clearly 
purchased by consumers for what they 'say' rather than for what they do."). 
42. But cf McCarthy, supra n. 40, at § 7.20, 7-39 (arguing that "what is crucial is 
the medium, not the message.") Prof. McCarthy contends that "if the line is drawn on 
the basis of content rather than medium, the result . . . is that no one would, as a 
practical matter, ever have a successful claim for unpermitted use of their identity in a 
'commercial setting. '" !d. at §7.20, 7-39 to 7-40. Prof. McCarthy'S argument is weak; 
it assumes that the absence of successful claims would be a bad thing, and therefore 
concludes that any First Amendment analysis that leads to that result is deficient. 
Moreover, his premise is false: a celebrity would still have an action for any false 
representation of endorsement. What Prof. McCarthy wants to preserve is a cause of 
action based solely on the potential for economic gain to the celebrity, and not based on 
any harm to the public. 
43. See supra n. 22 and accompanying text. 
44. See David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna 
White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. Intel!. Prop. L. 67, 95-100 (1995) 
(arguing that celebrities sometimes use the right of publicity to bypass the limits on 
defamation imposed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and its 
progeny). 
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notorious) example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a First Amendment 
defense for an advertisement that appeared to parody game-show 
hostess Vanna White.45 In another example, an advertisement that 
satirized New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani was held to be 
protected.46 To the extent these cases depend on the judgment that 
some celebrity depictions contain a "message" while others do not, 
they would appear to be inconsistent with both recent Supreme Court 
precedent47 and with the Court's oft-repeated admonition that "[i]t 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law 
to constitute themselves the final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations.,,48 And to the extent that these cases depend upon the 
lesser protection accorded "commercial speech"-which the Supreme 
Court has defined as "sfseech that does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction" 9-they raise the question of whether 
otherwise protected speech should lose its protection simply because it 
appears in an advertising context,50 a question that goes beyond the 
issues raised in the Tiger Woods case. 
45. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh 'g 
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, O'Scannlain & Kleinfeld, JJ., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The advertisement featured a photograph 
of a robot wearing a blond wig, turning letters on a "Wheel of Fortune" game board, 
thereby implying that Vanna White could be replaced by a robot. Id. at 1396. The 
decision has been criticized in numerous articles. See e.g. Stephen R. Barnett, First 
Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 Tort & Ins. LJ. 635 (1995); 
Weikowitz, supra n. 44. 
46. See New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 125 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (advertisement containing text "Possibly the only good thing in New York 
Rudy hasn't taken credit for."). While this advertisement could be considered political 
speech, First Amendment limits on defamation depend on whether the subject is a 
"public figure" and on whether the speech is a "matter of public concern," not on 
whether the speech can be characterized as "political speech." See e.g. Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 333-34 (1974) (public figures); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-59 (1985) (matters of public concern). 
47. See Hurley v. Irish-Am., Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
568 (1995) ("a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection"). 
48. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, 
J.). Immediately after the above statement, however, Holmes added the qualifier 
"outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits," id., leaving a modern observer to 
wonder just what those limits are and how "obvious" they can be . .  
49. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 423 (1993) 
(emphasis added). 
50. See Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1996) 
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Shortly after the decision in ETW, I was contacted by Jireh's 
counsel, Dennis Niermann, asking me for my thoughts on the district 
court's opinion.51 1 responded that I thought the district court had 
reached the proper result; and in the event that ETW decided to appeal, 
I offered to contact other professors to join an amicus brief on Jireh's 
behalf. When ETW appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit, Dennis 
accepted my offer of assistance. I needed someone to write the brief, 
and at the suggestion of my colleague Professor David Welkowitz, I 
turned to one of the nation's leading authorities on the conflict between 
the right of publicity and the First Amendment: Professor Diane 
Leenheer Zimmerman of New York University Law School.52 Diane 
graciously agreed to draft the brief if I would help edit it and recruit 
additional signatories. After we were confident that the draft was in 
good shape, Diane posted the draft on the NYU website, and I 
circulated the draft by e-mail to other faculty members around the 
country. I was aided in this effort by Prof. Edward P. Richards of the 
University of Missouri at Kansas City, who posted the draft brief to his 
own website and forwarded my messages to the LA WPROF discussion 
list; and Professor Eugene Volokh of the University of California at 
Los Angeles,53 who forwarded the draft and my messages to his 
Constitutional Law discussion list. 
(rejecting argument that "newsworthy" information remains protected when used in an 
advertisement); Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in 
Advertising: Some Counterpoints to Professor McCarthy, 18 Hastings Commun. & 
Ent. L.J. 593 (1996); While most advertising uses might be perceived as an implied 
endorsement by the celebrity depicted, surely uses in which the celebrity is criticized or 
mocked would not carry such an implication. Id. at 594-95, 597-99. Such uses 
therefore ought to remain protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 597-99. Cf Tyler 
T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a Parody, 45 1. 
Copy. Socy. 546, 615-620, 626-28 (1998) (discussing First Amendment interest in 
permitting criticism of public figures and corporations through the vehicle of copyright 
and trademark parody). 
51. Mr. Niermann contacted me because of comments I had made about the case on 
CNI-Copyright, a copyright discussion list sponsored by the Coalition for Networked 
Information. Those comments are archived at <http://www.cni.orglHforums/cni­
copyrightlI999-01l0547.html> (accessed Nov. 26, 2000). 
52. See Zimmemian, supra n .41, at 53-82 (discussing the need to rethink rights of 
publicity in light of developments in the Supreme Court's treatment of commercial 
speech). 
53. Professor Volokh has argued persuasively elsewhere that the generous standard 
for granting preliminary injunctions in intellectual property cases creates a serious risk 
of enjoining constitutionally protected speech. See Mark A. Lemley and Eugene 
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What follows is the product of our efforts. While I would like to 
be able to take credit for the amicus brief itself, my own contribution 
was limited to proofreading, cite-checking,54 and a handful of editorial 
suggestions. The brief bears the distinct stamp of its creator, Diane 
Zimmerman, and it is appropriate that she receiv�. sole authorship 
credit.55 I am pleased, however, to have played a role in recruiting her 
to draft the brief, and in recruiting a total of seventy-three law 
professors from around the country to join in her work. Although 
amicus curiae briefs were also submitted on behalf of many interested 
parties, 56 we sincerely hope that our view, untainted as it is by any 
economic interest in the outcome, will be of assist�,nce to the Sixth 
Circuit in resolving this appeal, and to other courts facing similar issues 
in future cases. 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke 
LJ. 147 (1998). 
54. I would like to thank my research assistant, Gary Schneider, for cite-checking 
the draft; and my secretary, Mary James, for preparing the table of authorities. 
55. Cf Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991) (actress who recruited 
playwright and provided research and editorial suggestions was not a "joint author" of 
the resulting copyrightable work). 
56. Amicus Curiae briefs in support of ETW were submitted by (1) Elvis Presley 
Enterprises, Inc.; The Autry Survivor's Trust (Gene Autry); Sheffield Enterprises, Inc. 
(Frank Sinatra); Wayne Enterprises, LLP (John Wayne); Experience Hendrix, Inc. 
(Jimi Hendrix); Arnold Palmer Enterprises, Inc.; Jonesheirs, Inc. (Bobby Jones); and 
Global Icons, Inc. (numerous celebrities); (2) National Football League Players 
Association; (3) Major League Baseball Players Association; and (4) the Screen Actors 
Guild. Amicus Curiae briefs in support of Jireh were submitted by (1) the American 
Society of Media Photographers; Advertising Photographers of America; National 
Press Photographers Association; American Society of Picture Professionals; Picture 
Agency Council of America; Editorial Photographers; North American Nature 
Photography Association; Graphic Artists Guild, UA W Local 3030); and The Author's 
Guild, Inc.; (2) The New York Times Co.; Time, Inc.; and Newspaper Association of 
America; (3) �eporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press; and Society of 
Professional Journalists; and (4) Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts;. Georgia Volunteer 
Lawyers for the Arts; and the Albany/Schenectady League of the Arts. 
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